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Col. Ware Let me first give you my background in Viet Nam. I was a Ranger 
advisor, the first one they had in 1 67 and 1 68. A mechanized infantry 
battalion, part time brigade with the 25th Division, southwest of 
Saigon. In 1 71 and 1 72 I had a brigade with the 101st ___ Division, 
up near Huay. I saw quite a bit of the country. Your interest in 
tactics, in counter insurgency tactics - I was lucky enought the first 
time to go to the Military Assistance Institute and we had a guest 
speaker that many people had not heard of then named Bernard Fall. 
I got to know him fairly well over the next several years. His book 
was not out yet, that is his first book, Street Without Joy, My wife 
looked for it and sent it over to me and I got the fist copies in Viet Nam. 
It gave a pretty good view of the war then, an encapsuled view. And 
while we were there, we tried to study what the French had done, what 
they'd done right, what they'd done wrong. What the Viet Minh had done. 
Everyone started getting interested in counter insurgency. And they 
wanted to try to find out what happened in Malaysia and in the Phillipines 
They sent me down to Malaysia for a fortnight to go through the jungle 
warfare school there. At the time I was there they had active counter 
insurgency going on up in the North. I remember coming back and writing 
a paper to the chief MAAG (military assistance advisory group) telling 
him what I thought the differences were between the situation in Malaysia 
and South Viet Nam and they were considerable. Some of those differences, 
one would be control for one thing, the administration. The British still 
had control in Malaya. They had granted independence, but they still 
retained control. The ethnic breakout of the insurgents was different in 
Malay than it was in Viet Nam. In Malaya the insurgents, of course, were 
Chinese, and the Malayan population didn't like the Chinese. It was not 
Malayse against Maylayse, but Malayse against Chinese. The magnitude 
of the problem was entirely different. Through most of the war the 
biggest attack, the Communist terrorists could muster was about a platoon. 
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And even by 1961, the VC were mounting battalion sized attacks. And 
there were a whole host of things, geography, political, ethnic differences, 
much greater than was the case in Malaya. So it should not have been a 
question of what worked in one environment to another. To include 
the idea of strategic hamlets, which worked well in Malaya, because there 
weren't that many people involved there and these people weren't tied to 
the land as the Vietnamese were tied to their homes. You uproot those 
people and you create many more problems than you would have done by doing 
nothing. You try a strategic hamlet in Viet Nam and every province chief 
vies with others to make certain that his hamlets look more strategic than 
the others. Such a hamlet or province chief would put a string of barbed 
wire around the hamlet and say it was a strategic hamlet. Issue a few 
weapons and the VC would knock them off the next night. They did not 
do the thorough kind of preparation on the strategic hamlets that had 
been done in Malaya. They did not have the administrative machinery, 
they did not have the bureaucracy that the Malayse had . It was entirely 
different. 
Why did we go so for fortified hamlets? For awhile that was the thing 
that was really going to save South Viet Nam. 
Right, the people, I thought, could not understand the difference between 
Malaya and Vietnamese. They did not understand the problem or the enemy 
we were fighting. They tried to do too much too fast without sufficient 
resources. You realize that at that time after Diem was killed, 
they were changing the government almost on a monthly basis. And when the 
government changed all the province chiefs changed, all the district chiefs 
changed way down the line. There was constant turmoil. And many of those 
who were in control were Catholics from the North who had no real feelings 
for the people in the South over whom they were administering. People 






the Roman Catholic administrators and they were not communicating with their 
own people. Background, aspirations were very different. Lack of 
continuity and the great competition ruined the program. When Diem was 
there, his brother Nhu was in charge of the program. And Nhu was exhorting 
people to build more and faster and to outdo each other and it was all paper 
tiger. 
Was the body count going on at that time? 
I don't think they called it that at that time. In every war people keep 
track of casualties. You kill so many, you wound so many, you normally 
try to keep track of such casulaties. The term "body count" instead 
of something like comparative casualties or simply casualty list was 
probably an unfortunate choice. Some peopl~ did go to ridiculous extremes, 
obviously. To exaggerate the enemies' casualties and to minimize our own. 
The difficult thing about the body count was the visions it caused people 
back in the United States. It seemed cold blooded. 
I understand, also, in helping to establish body counts, they counted 
blood trails and weapon finds and so forth. 
Yes, I think that was going on. If one finds a lot of bloody bandages someplace 
or other, you can estimate that you've hurt somebody. I remember going 
through - when my Ranger company was ambushed - behind a clump of banana 
trees, there were some brains there, you could pretty well establish that 
that man was dead - the brains it belonged to. Those things go on. 
And the Americans got totally involved in it. 




Throughout, but the emphasis changed. I'm sure you're familiar with the 
three phases of Mao's Revolutionary War. Initially, Phase I is always 
purely and solely guerilla war. Then they start ___ up training 
and equipping then in Phase II they're still on the strategic defensive, but 
the tactical offenses. Meanwhile, however, the peasant population is 
supporting the guerrillas, giving them places to hide, giving them food 
providing resources to main force units. And then even in Phase III, which 
is total offensive, guerrilas were still doing their thing So that in 
one way it was a guerilla war throughout. Except, that after TET 1 68, 
the guerillas were much less important. Because, they were pretty well 
wiped out. When, they through the dice, the gamble for the allout win, 
and lost they suffered tremendous casualties. Their infra structure in the 
towns and the villages was low. And was after TET that the North Vietnamese 
began operating on a large scale, although they had been operating in smaller 
numbers even previously. They didn't joint the main attacks except around 
the Khesanh. They were always just simply to back up the VC. 
You mentioned Khesahn. Why would we defend a place like that, so totally 
and so completely and then just immediately evacuate? 
Have you read Westmorland's book? He gives there his rationale for doing 
it. His hope was to hang on to that place as a point of departure or base 
if you will, in case he ever got authority to escalate the war, he would 
have troops on station in a place where it could start from. After TET, 
it became quite obvious that we were not going to be granted all the 
resources that we might want or desire . And, so in Westmorland's mind there 
was no longer any reason to contiue to hold Khesahn and so it was 
evacuated. Everybody looked at Khesahn and said and American Dien Bien 
Phu. Yet, it's hard to compare Kheshan and Dien Bien Phu . It was useful 
perhaps as a magnet to bring Vietnamese forces in where they could get 





purpose after all. 
There is a question Colonel that I would like you to think about, it 
runs something like this. When, on our side, the war became a large unit 
conflict, against large scale Vietnamese efforts, why was our fire power 
and mobility and our long military experience, why didn't we win? 
We won all the big battles, we lost the war. Because we were fighting 
the wrong kind of war. 
How do you mean that? 
We were emphasizing the physical aspects of strategy and tactics. And we 
didn't fully understand the psychological aspects which applied in Viet 
Nam. So, while winning the vast majority of the big battles, we did not 
obtain political objectives. 
l 





Well, Col. Ware, do you think, and you would be in a good position to 
know, here at the War College, - Are lessons learned from Viet Nam 
really being absorbed by the Army? 
Not yet. Not yet. I have a study project here that's just getting under 
way to examine this peculiar effort. To find from it the lessons learned. 
The Amry has been ducking its responsibilities. The government has also 
not just the Army. I think that as our longest and most traumatic war 
and one we can truly say we lost, we've got to look inside. Not for 
scapegoats, not for witchhunts, but in an objective responsible way 
without biases. And to say - what does it all mean . There are many 
things in there that cover similar if not identical situations . 
Could you hold forth on some of those thoughts for a few moments. 
Well, now the study hasn't really gotten started yet. But I've done 
some thinking about it. I've given a few talks around the area. These 
are my own personal thoughts. I start out with about six caveats of 
things I am not. Perhaps we're still too close to it to study it but 
I don't think so. Perhaps we are too emotionally involved, but I don't 
think so. What some of those caveats. Well, I'm not an academic expert; 
I can't get rid of my own objectivity. The matter is complex and sensitive 
There's a voluminous amount of wheat and chafe possibly it's too soon. There 
are problems with the lessons and extrapolations and thus it's much a case 
of finding the correct identity. To begin with, we had a shifting set of 
objectives. First, we wanted an independent South Viet Nam. We were 
interested in containing the spread of monolithic Communism. Thirdly, 
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we wanted to defeat refolutionary warfare or wars of national liberation. 
Fourthly, we wanted to improve U.S. credibility and resolve world wide 
Fifthly, we did not want to lose our first war. Sixth, we wanted to save 
U.S. pride and prestiege and not lose faith. Seven, return of US POW 
MIA personnel. And lastly, a peace -with honor. And we have some dilemmas 
if we should be faced with a similar situation. We would have to consider 
good versus bad wars, short versus long wars, necessary versus unnecessary 
wars, near versus far wars, cheap versus expensive wars in terms both 
of dollars and people, total versus limited wars, clear versus vague and 
shifting results, victory versus indecisive results, the regulars versus 
our boys. 
It's too bad, isn't it, that the regulars are never anybody's boys. They're 
mercenaries. 
The list goes on. Fair versus unnecessary burdens, David versus Goliath 
political theirs versus patriotic ours. And here are some other thoughts 
there may be some that are repititious. The stab in the back syndrome 
that is where the military complains that they could have won had they 
not been held back by political forces within the civilian population 
as the Germans did in WWI and as the French did in North Africa . Where 
the military might say, "look, we won all the battles, but you feliows caused 
us to lose the war. 11 Where the military was turned off against the government 
and turned against them. You guys lost the war. But in the U.S. that didn't 
happen after Viet Nam. General Smith quite often has made the point and made 
it quite well, that the military swallowed and stepped forward and moved 
out after Viet Nam. Questions raised both by Viet Nam and Watergate - that 
is distrust of leaders. Civil and military. Peace with honor. Usefulness 
of military force. Have we lost our national will or determination. Are 







history on the side of the US of the USSR. Should the can do spirit be 
replaced by "sorry, sir, can't do. 11 And/or shouldn't do. You see this 
can do attitude was one of our big problems. The military would be given 
a mission and they weren't consulted and were left out of the decision and 
still said "can do. 11 If they had understood the war, the would have 
realized the chances of winning were nil and would have said so. The 
cost would be great . Some of them should have stood up to their leaders 
and said 11 we can't do this with these constraints - we can't do this. 11 
Is this really possible in the military? 
Yes, I would. Of course, I've been around a long time and I've only got 
a year to go before I retire. But I believe that's what we should do . 
Could you have done that as a major? 
Oh yeah. I would have done it as a lieutenant, a second lieutenant. 
OK, how widely do you think your feelings might be shared by others? 
Not enough. I think Gen. Smith feels the same way . Unfortunately, 
we don't have enough of that kind who are able to say, "sorry sir, can't do. 11 
First, I don't think enough of our military every really understood the 
kind of war we were going to fight in Viet Nam. We though once we got 
in there with our fire power, our mobility, our technology, that we 
could do it. Filled with this "can do 11 spirit. This optimism. Think 
of some of the catch words we used in Viet Nam. Bait and trap, search 
and destroy, Gen. DePew suggested that one to Gen. Westmorland. Then 
there was rice assault, that's where you sent someone out to see is rice 






lasted through one commander. Then someone else would change them. And 
search and destroy became reconnaisance and force. Well, there are 
other things that need to be considered. For example, what is the role 
of the USA in the world. Credibility of the USA. Why, when, where and 
how should forces be inserted into action. And all of this things the 
military certainly were touched by Viet Nam and Watergate. What 
the military must do is understand what kind of war it's fighting and 
the people that will be involved therein. 
Col. do you know, did your paths every possibly cross that of Lt. Col. 
Gene Sauvageot? 
Yes, I think so. 
Sauvageot has told me in the past that he has written, out of his own 
vast experience in Viet Nam, - report after report, which he filed, but 
which he honestly didn't believe that anyone actually even ever read. 
Do you think that was an occurance shared by others? 
Well, you know happened to John Paul Van in the "can do" era. The attitude 
was optimistic , Van's was not, he was a pessimist. Perhaps Van overstepped 
his role there but nevertheless he was probably right. More right than 
they were in Saigon, but Saigon did not listen to him. He was more realistic 
than they were - he knew the situation better. And he was able to see things 
and hear things and store them up in his mind, yet. What Van was saying 
was totally out of synch with reports eminating from headquarters in 
Saigon. And there were a number of people like that. A person hears 
what he wants to hear. That's military history. 




it is amazing how headquarters at various levels could be so determinedly 
optimistic in their own views. 
Well, as those reports went up through the chain of command they were 
filtered. I guess any bureaucracy· has things go up the chain they are 
softened, compromises are made . Things are toned down. Until originally 
a red flag being waved ends up as another color of flag entirely. 
Col. I'll have to tell you a story. A few years ago while on bivouac, I 
and the chaplain happened to walk into a tent where a sex movie was being 
shown. And it was a pretty bad sex movie. There was this woman being 
ravished by a dog. And I caused the projector to be stopped and I 
submitted a report that I was pretty unhappy with the sort of movies that 
were being shown to the men. That they should not be allowed. And that 
report went to brigade which submitted a report to higher headquarters that 
the chaplain was rather unhappy with the quality of movies being shown. 
Battalion's report was forwarded to brigade that the chaplain had noted 
that the men were watching movies. Brigade forwarded to division that 
the chaplain noted that the men's recreational needs were being taken care 
of by showing movies to them. That's probably in effect the same sort 
of filtering you have in mind with regard to the reports, the negative 
reports about field activities that were submitted in Viet Nam. 
Other factors that would need to be taken into consideration in future wars 
would be proportional means, used for specific ends. Continuity or lack 
of it. Lessons from Malaysia and other places. Working with the government 
of Viet Nam trying to work at all levels to achieve ends. We must remember 
that we Americanized the war without having total control of the situation 
there and that was very difficult. It was their country I'm not sure 





it. We had too many people there, civil and military giving advice. Many 
of them not really qualified. It overburdened the system. We didn't 
understand their problem, and I don't think they understood ours. 
With reference to overwhelming Col. Be of the National Training Center of 
Viet Nam was recently telling me that the yearly military budget for 
South Vietnam was 5 times , no military aid, was 5 times the size of their 
national budget. And their national budget was 3 times the size of their 
gross national product. So this would truly be overwhelming and over-
burdening. That's an awful lot of money pouring, ruining an economy. Other 
factors that would be considered in - political lessons. National strategies, 
objectives, the role of dissent in and out of the United States. International 
RVN, Democratic Republic of North Viet Nam and the USSR, NATO and others. 
War, immoral and/or illegal. Wars are always immoral but there's sometimes 
things more immoral than war . All of those things that I've been suggesting 
are strawmen but they're good catch words. Killing a man is worse than 
burning his house. You can -get awfully involved arguments on this. WAs 
it justifiable or not. I understand that at the War College, you now 
have a Department of Ethics . 
Not a department. Rather it's a part of the command and management thing. 
They're working out ethics of war. 
What was your view Col. about the constant changing of battalion commands. 
Was this a mixed, blessed bag? 
Was it a positive factor, was it a negative factor on morale and aon 
unit integrity. 
The six month tour was negative on balance . It was later changed to a one 







turmoil. A man getting used to his unit, the men getting used to him, 
getting used to the environment, and most of them were ambitious. And that's 
not bad. Ambitious people are the ones that do things and the fellows who 
wanted to make their mark in six months. That was it, that was all the 
time they had, That was during Viet Nam the most critical thing in a 
man's military career. If he didn .'t have that on his records, as a combat 
arms officer, or if he didn't do well at it while he was in command, 
then his chances of going to a senior service school or receiving further 
promotion were nil. So these people went all out to make their record 
in that short length of time. 
What in your view would be an optimum time for command? 
I think a year or 18 months. Of course, in a peacetime environment it's 
18 months or 2 years for battalion and brigade commanders. 
If you have a bad one, two years is a long time. How much of an intensive 
study will this committee have here. 
It's about a 2 year effort. 
How many people will be involved? 
It will vary. We'll have a number of people to include major contractors 
over a 14 month period. We have a horizontal approach here where as 
study team chairman will have his own cadre to bring in advisors as they 
see fit. It's unofficial, it's unblessed, open book. From the army 
perspective. We tend to isolate in this study the Army from the rest of 
the sister services. At least we're going to tell the sister services 
how our action impinged upon theirs and theirs upon us. How we saw 
things, what we did and how our actions affected other people. Trying 
to get some focus on this thing of Viet Nam. We'll have some students 
who will volunteer to do some pieces of it. 0 yes, we will involve 
the students. We have a Viet Nam elective here for the last 2 years. 
And I've been monitoring it and that's been helpful to us. Ge. 
Westmorland has come twice, the Chief of Staff, people from state, all 
of them will be adding their perspective. USIA, the AID people. A lot 
of these people have been starting to have second thoughts. And are 
saying I really see where we made this mistake or that mistake or when 
the joint chiefs are stuck in here . We'll have work shops, symposia, 
multiple input sort of thing. We'll have 60 categories or sub-topics 
in the study. And we'll try except where we have to prove a point to stay 
out of the tactical area. Try to keep it on a higher level. Grand tactics, 
grand strategy and in the national strategy. 
